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1. Introduction 
“I have worked on oil spills damage issues all over the world and I have never in my life and in my professional 
career seen an ecological habitat and human communities as damaged by oil spills as Bodo and Ogoni1 [in the 
Niger Delta]. It’s been absolutely devastated beyond belief to be honest with you […] the fishing opportunities of 
the Niger Delta have declined severely over the last 30 years to some extent from the chronic oil pollution and from 
other habitat damage caused by oil development in the Niger Delta such as pipelines constructions, dredging 
channels across the communities. The Niger Delta has been dramatically changed by oil development.” (extract 
from the interview with International Advocacy NGO) 
Belal et al., (2015, p.12) claimed that ‘whilst multinational enterprises continue to be driven by profit 
maximisation and capital accumulation, we fear that environmental responsibility and accountability 
within vulnerable developing economies will remain elusive.’ Multinational corporations have been 
accused of complicity with host governments in the destruction of ecosystems, the violation of human 
rights, including the right to life, water, work, safety, healthy environment, education and free assembly, in 
developing countries (Abah and Okwori, 2006; Ruggie, 2013; Sikka, 2011). Many of these violations2 
occur in countries where national laws and regulatory mechanisms are ineffective in ensuring corporations 
adhere to laws, their duty to respect human rights and any felt moral duty to be socially and 
environmentally responsible (Belal et al., 2015; Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016).  
In this paper, we extend prior research on external accounting3 by developing conceptual and empirical 
insights into the use of counter accounts by international advocacy NGOs (iaNGO) as part of their 
campaigns for reform of the governance and accountability processes associated with impact of oil 
companies in the Niger Delta on environmental pollution, human rights abuse, social conflicts, poverty, 
health and biodiversity (e.g. Akpan, 2008; Aroh et al., 2010; Dokpesi, 2013; Eregha and Irughe, 2009; 
Frynas, 2003; Konne, 2014; Ndubuisi and Asia, 2007; Omeje, 2005; Pegg and Zabbey, 2013). These 
studies have been highly critical of corporate practices, corporate social responsibility initiatives, poor 
accountability mechanisms, ineffective regulatory frameworks, inadequate enforcement of laws and 
standards, and the inability of civil society to engage in governance processes. 
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Counter accounts are produced by, or on behalf of, individuals who suffer from the consequences of the 
actions of others. Typically, these accounts originate from civil society organisations to represent the 
voices of the less powerful in order to justify some form of emancipatory institutional and organisational 
changes (Apostol, 2015; Gallhofer et al., 2006). Counter accounts are conceptualised as symbolic political 
tactics that create alternative representations of the consequences of problematic conduct, in order to 
seek changes in the way things are done within existing systems of governing, reform of the system of 
governing or a radical restructuring of the system of governing (Cooper et al., 2005; Everett, 2004; 
Gallhofer et al., 2006; Shenkin and Coulson, 2007; Spence, 2009). Counter accounting is differentiated 
from other forms of external accounting due to its explicit oppositional perspective to challenge and 
confront dominant and unequal power relations, unacceptable political ideologies and to delegitimise 
corporate unsustainable practices by giving voice to oppressed groups (Bebbington et al., 2007; Cooper et 
al., 2005; Boyce, 2014; Dey and Gibbons, 2014; Everett, 2004; Gray et al., 2014a; Spence, 2009). 
Counter accounts incorporate accounting and accountability techniques to problematise a target entity’s 
reputation, power and legitimacy (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Gallhofer et al., 2006; Gray et al., 
2014b; Kneip, 2013; Joutsenvirta, 2011; Tregidga, 2013, 2017). Of particular relevance in this paper is the 
ability of counter accounts to de-localise, escalate or resolve conflicts through presenting accounts of 
harmful consequences occurring in one location to other arenas, particularly when the problem is allowed 
to perpetuate due to problematic power imbalances or systems of governance. Counter accounts seek to 
communicate these negative consequences to those causing the harm and to those with power over those 
causing the harm (Apostol, 2015; Frankental, 2011; Gray et al., 2014b; Spence, 2009; Tregidga, 2017; 
Vinnari and Laine, 2017).  
The ability of counter accounts and other social accounts to drive emancipatory and democratic changes 
in governance and accountability systems is subject to considerable debate in the accounting research 
literature (Adams, 2004; Apostol, 2015; Blackburn et al., 2014; Cooper et al., 2005; Dillard and Roslender, 
2011; Gallhofer et al., 2006, 2011, 2015; Gray and Gray, 2011; Li and McKernan, 2016; Sikka, 2006, 2011; 
Spence, 2009; Tregidga, 2017; Vinnari and Laine, 2017).  As part of this debate, we report on why some 
iaNGOs consider counter accounting a useful part of their engagement strategies.  
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This paper contributes to Rahaman’s (2010) call for accounting research on the problem of corruption 
and environmental degradation that strips Africa of its wealth and natural endowments at the expense of 
indigenous communities. It is also motivated by calls (e.g. Dey et al., 2011; Dey and Gibbon, 2014; Gray et 
al., 2014b; Sikka, 2011; Tregidga et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2017; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2016; Vinnari and 
Laine, 2017) for research on counter accounts that seek to problematize, transform and represent 
vulnerable, marginalised, oppressed stakeholders whose human rights have been violated. Therefore, we 
develop and apply the conflict arena framework presented by Thomson et al. (2015) in our investigation 
into the use of counter-accounts by iaNGOs in conflict escalation and attempts at conflict resolution in a 
highly contested, politicised arena. Conflict arenas, as a method for constructing research projects have 
been used in a range of different social and environmental controversies (e.g. Dey and Russell, 2014; 
Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988; Tregidga, 2013, 2017). These studies 
use the arena as a metaphor to represent the symbolic location of engagements associated with a 
controversy that affects and is affected by a number of different arena participants. An arena is a space 
where political institutions, rule enforcers, stakeholders, corporations, civil society groups, communities, 
general public and the media interact (Renn, 1992).  
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section we discuss the theoretical framing used to understand 
and interpret the empirical evidence gathered. In Section 3, we outline the research methods adopted and 
in section 4, we present and analyse the evidence from our documentary evidence and interview evidence 
gathered in section 5. The final section provides our concluding thoughts, contributions and limitations of 
this study.  
 
2. Accountability, Counter-Accounting, Engagements and Transformations  
The absence of effective accountability in the Niger Delta was noted by Idemudia (2007), where he 
argued that the social obligations of the corporations and the government to communities have not been 
met. Rather marginalised communities were manipulated with inappropriate representation or non-
disclosure of facts, further perpetuating tensions and conflicts. Dialogic accountability mechanisms are 
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one approach that could facilitate the engagement of the marginalised in discourses for equality of power, 
effective governance, human rights protection, inclusive ownership and sustainable development 
(Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Brown and Dillard, 2015; Dillard, 2014; Thomson and 
Bebbington, 2005). In this paper, we draw on the arguments of Bebbington et al., 2007; Blackburn et al., 
2014; Brown and Dillard, 2015; Brown et al., 2015; Contrafatto et al., 2015 and others, that systems of 
governance and accountability should seek to establish formal and informal structures for transformative 
dialogue, which does not silence the voices of marginalised groups or exclude accounts of the everyday 
realities of the oppressed communities. Counter accounting is considered to be part of these informal 
transformative discursive engagements (Dey and Gibbon, 2014; Gallhofer et al., 2006).  
The absence of formal gover ance and accountability systems designed to respect and protect human 
rights and sustainable development is argued to drive alternative accounting practices, including counter 
accounts, to fill any perceived gaps in the evidence or knowledge required to govern inclusively and 
effectively (Blackburn et al., 2014; Brown, 2009; Brown and Dillard, 2015; Thomson and Bebbington, 
2005). Through the use of counter accounts alternative networks of accountability and governance 
emerge in order to problematize and resolve problems by attempting to trigger interventions from those 
with the power to resolve conflicts, particularly those arising from abuses associated with unequal power 
relations (Bebbington et al., 2007; Dillard and Roslender, 2011; Hazelton, 2013; Thomson et al., 2015). 
Counter accounting combined with social activism is often associated with political campaigns to improve 
the lives of oppressed groups or our natural environment (Bebbington et al., 2007; Gallhofer et al., 2006; 
Gray et al., 2014b; Thomson and Bebbington, 2005, 2004; Tregidga, 2017; Spence, 2009). 
The proliferation of counter accounts by campaigning individuals or civil society organisations in an arena 
suggests an absence of effective governance or accountability mechanisms that address unequal power 
relations, the respect and protection of human rights, equitable distribution of wealth, and sustainable 
development (Dey et al., 2011; Gallhofer et al., 2011; Thomson et al., 2015). It is argued that counter 
accounting combined with organised social activism could initiate practices of freedom to address 
inequalities of power in any arena (Bebbington et al., 2007; Gray et al., 2014b; Thomson and Bebbington, 
2005, 2004; Tregidga, 2017).  
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In conflict arenas activists, such as NGOs or civil society organisations, could increase the possibilities of 
mitigating current problems or prevent future negative consequences by incorporating their expertise to 
legitimate the problems of communities through counter accounting (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; 
Joutsenvirta, 2011; Kneip, 2013; Spence, 2009). Individual counter accounts can be combined with other 
external accounts that collectively problematise and present alternative solutions increasing the knowledge 
set that can inform arena engagements, dialogue, coalition building, and conflict resolution. Prior research 
on counter accounts and other forms of external accounts (Apostol, 2015; Dey and Gibbon, 2014; 
Gallhofer et al., 2006; Thomson et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2013, 2017; Vinnari and Laine, 2017) has observed 
that these accounts play many different roles in conflicts. Evaluating external accounts in practice is 
therefore a complex process. Thomson et al. (2015) noted that individual external accounts rarely served a 
single purpose or were intended for a single audience and often contained examples of systematic, 
partisan, contra-governmental techniques that were designed to confront British American Tobacco 
(BAT), escalate the conflict and facilitate co-operation or anti-BAT coalition building. They also 
suggested that external accounts had to be understood in relation to the historical development of the 
conflict and the engagements amongst arena participants. For example, sometimes counter accounts 
emerge from a process of dialogue, while in other situations dialogue is initiated or altered through the 
publication of a counter account. The specific context of the conflict combined with the intentions of the 
account preparer may have an important impact on the possibilities of future dialogue and the nature of 
the dialogue. In some cases, the dialogue may be co-operative, open and moving towards consensus; in 
other cases, it may be more challenging and confrontational; or could be specifically designed to create 
divergence amongst selected arena participants.  
Thomson et al., (2015) developed a dynamic arena framework to analyse external accounting in the 
context of complex evolving programmes of activism involving different actors in a series of 
interconnected conflict arenas. Drawing on prior research (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; 
Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; Gray, 1997; Harte and Owen, 1987; Joutsenvirta, 2011; Kneip, 
2013;  Medawar, 1976; O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 2009), they argued that  external accounting, which 
includes counter-accounting, incorporated a range of discursive and accounting practices that could be 
applied in different ways for different purposes in different conflict arenas at different stages as a conflict 
Page 5 of 52 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal
6 
 
evolves over time (Beck and Wilms, 2004; Power, 2004). Thomson et al., (2015) framework offers a way 
to understand how and why specific combinations of counter accounts and activist practices are 
deployed in different conflict arenas and how they could engage more effectively with prevailing 
overnance regimes. Their application of this framework to the BAT/Action on Health and Smoking 
(ASH4) conflicts identified the importance of aligning external accounts with changing frames of the 
issues being problematised depending on who was deemed responsible and who was deemed able to 
resolve the problem (see also Apostol, 2015; Cooper et al., 2005, 2011; Gallhofer et al., 2006; Tregidga, 
2013, 2017; Vinnari and Laine, 2017).  
These assumptions as to who is able to resolve a problem, how to resolve that problem and what needs 
to be changed are critical to the design of counter accounts and counter accounting processes. For 
example, Thomson et al., (2015) identified accounts that were intended to work within existing forms of 
governing providing information to trigger disciplinary measures to systematically resolve a problem. 
When the existing governing and accountability systems were considered appropriate to deal with the 
problematic actions of individuals or organisations, then counter accounts would seek to make visible 
these actions to rule enforcers using their preferred language, form of evidence and communication 
media. These systematic counter accounts were designed to resolve problems through enabling the 
effective operation of existing governing processes.  
However, when the problematic consequences resulted from a combination of problematic behaviour 
that was legitimated by a problematic governing system, then a different form of counter account was 
required. In this context, the counter account would make visible the problematic aspect of the system of 
governing, rather than the problematic behaviour of an individual or organisation. This escalation of the 
conflict could be accompanied by a partisan counter account that presents a compelling case for 
reforming an aspect of the system of governing to those with powers to do so.  The content of a partisan 
counter account will be determined by the political or governing processes associated with regulatory 
reform, rather than by evidence of the specific problematic behaviour. Partisan counter accounts look to 
frame examples of problematic behaviour as problems of governance by challenging the legitimacy and 
credibility of existing rule enforcers.    
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Thomson et al., (2015) also discuss how certain problems are created by problematic behaviour by 
individuals/organisations, legitimated by problematic systems of governing that are embedded with 
problematic structures of governing and ideology. Any resolution of these problems will require more 
structural change at the governmental level. In this context, transformation is considered contra-
governmental and any associated contra-governmental counter accounts will challenge the underlying 
rationality or ideology of the system of governing, e.g. globalisation of trade, use of market reforms, with 
the intention of replacing it (Russell and Thomson, 2008; Dean, 2010). These contra-governmental 
campaigns are political, oppositional and confrontational and involve significant conflict escalation. 
Contra-governmental counter accounts are likely to contain high level ideological critiques of governing 
structures and authored by a broad coalition of arena participants.  
Civic society campaigning strategies and counter accounts were observed to connect participants within 
and between conflict arenas in order to build coalitions of support to help with specific problems (Dey et 
al., 2011; Gallhofer et al., 2006; Thomson et al., 2015). Counter accounts could establish spaces for 
concepts, values and practices to interact by bridging and creating the possibility of engagement across 
different spaces and arenas (Contrafatto et al., 2015; Brown and Dillard, 2015; Brown et al., 2015; 
Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; Thomson et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2017). We contend that bridging 
counter accounts translate the problems, consequences and possible solutions of one arena participant 
into the everyday actions, values and cultures of other participants and of other arenas. These bridging 
counter accounts could enable wider dialogue, knowledge exchange, co-operative engagement, conflict 
escalation or resolution (Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2015; Dillard and Roslender, 2011).   
Bridging counter accounts allow aspects of the conflict to become detached from their origins and 
become incorporated into different arenas, channelling evidence and narratives across time, space and 
governing systems (Hoskin and Macve, 1994; Thomson et al., 2015). This ability to relocate and reframe 
the conflict allows arena participants to change the power dynamics in order to overcome any obstacles to 
the actualisation of their intended outcomes. Typically, an arena participant may look to escalate a 
particular conflict when an impasse is reached, by transferring the conflict to an arena where the 
distribution of power and disciplinary sanctions is better aligned to their outcomes. Through counter 
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accounts, reports of actions and consequences in one conflict arena can be represented in another arena 
where these actions and consequences are considered unacceptable. Counter accounts can be used to 
reframe these actions and consequences in ways that have greater traction/power in other conflict arenas. 
For example, a negative account of the consequences of an oil spill in an African village can be reframed 
as a human rights abuse allowing the prosecution of the company in its registered country.   
Although counter accounting is normally considered to be conflictual, oppositional and associated with 
de-legitimization (Dey and Gibbons, 2014; Gallhofer et al., 2006), in theory counter accounts could form 
part of a dialogic change process (Apostol, 2015; Gallhofer et al., 2006; Thomson et al., 2015; Tregidga, 
2013, 2017). However, hese dialogic characteristics cannot be assumed to be part of all counter 
accounting, particularly when dealing with structural issues such as the negative impact of globalization or 
sustainable development, or in long standing controversial arenas (Belal et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2015; 
Cooper et al., 2011; Dey and Gibbon, 2014; Lauwo and Otusanya, 2015; Sikka, 2006, 2011; Siddiqui and 
Uddin, 2016; Spence, 2009).  
Counter accounting has the capacity to challenge oppressive vested interests and to support change by 
speaking a particular version of the truth to power in pursuit of emancipatory outcomes (Brown and 
Dillard, 2015; Gallhofer et al., 2011, 2015; Gray et al., 2014b; Spence, 2009; Thomson et al., 2015; 
Tregidga, 2017). However, dialogic transformation requires some form of collective acceptance for 
dialogue and praxis among arena participants before any emancipatory outcomes emerge. Critical 
researchers argue that this collective acceptance should not be assumed to exist, especially when arena 
participants feel unable to suspend their ideological position or give up their powers to pursue actions for 
the common good (Gray and Gray, 2011; Medawar, 1976; Spence, 2009). (See for example, the warnings 
of Li and McKernan, (2016) to avoid the application of “folk-political thinking” rhetoric to oppose 
capitalism or globalization.) However, arriving at any solution, however temporary, normally emerges 
somehow from a history of problem denial, broken promises, breach of regulations, breakdown of trust, 
antagonism, and disagreement (Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Brown and Dillard, 2013). Our 
position is that non-action combined with poor or manipulative accountability in an oppressive and 
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exploitative situation is more likely to perpetuate problems rather than resolve them for the common 
good. 
Thomson et al., (2015) suggested that there was limited evidence of dialogic external accounts in the 
research literature, although they recognised their possible existence within dialogic activist campaigns. 
They did not identify any examples of dialogic external accounting in the conflict between ASH and BAT, 
nor did they discuss in detail the attributes that would be associated with dialogic external accounting. 
Nevertheless, the possibility that change could occur through the inclusion of counter-accounts in 
dialogic processes or the production of dialogic counter accounts should not be overlooked. We look to 
develop Thomson et al., (2015) model by drawing on Contrafatto et al., (2015) attributes of dialogic 
accounting in order to better understand and evaluate dialogic counter accounting, in particular how 
dialogic counter accounts should represent multiple perspectives or diversities of interests within situation 
of concern. Thomson et al., (2015) argued that the dialogic counter accounts form part of engagements 
that co-problematize existing ways of governing and limit situations in order to provide solutions that 
facilitate emancipatory change at an existential level and new forms of inclusive governing (Contrafatto et 
al., 2015; Burchell and Cook, 2013a, b; Freire, 2002).  
Dialogic counter accounts should expose the nature and contradictions of the impediments to 
emancipatory change. However, an important characteristic of dialogic accounts is a co-production 
process, which includes oppressed groups and authentically represents their voices. Dialogic counter 
accounts are generally assumed to be prepared by a civic society group in conjunction with oppressed 
groups in a conflict rather than with the oppressor groups.    
In dialogic activism, accounting entities are associated with problematic aspects of arena participants’ 
everyday life experiences and the obstacles that they need to overcome.  However, there is the paradox of 
how to enable oppressed or marginalised arena participants to recognise the need for change and develop 
their capacity to participate in any transformation process. In this case transformation may requ re the 
intervention of non-local activists, such as civil society groups and advocacy NGOs, who possess the 
knowledge, resources and alternative sources of power, to intervene on their behalf. However, there is a 
risk that these more powerful groups may dominate and control these processes imposing their values or 
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solutions onto the oppressed groups (Contrafatto et al., 2015; Freire, 2002). Contrafatto et al., (2015) 
suggest that non-local activists should involve the community to co-problematise oppressive aspects of 
their life; inspiring the emergence of community activists; bearing witness to their oppression from 
unsustainable thinking and action; and designing and implementing transformative projects. Therefore, 
dialogic counter-accounts should be used to support transformation projects rather than promote the 
interests of a particular arena participant.  
In this paper, we are interested in iaNGOs’ self-evaluation of their use of counter-accounts in resolving 
conflicts associated with the oil sector in the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta conflicts are characterised by a 
complex sequence of de-legitimating, re-legitimating accounts and engagements amongst different arena 
participants as they confront, counter-act, escalate, co-operate and engage in search of a solution. Of 
particular importance in this paper is the use of counter accounts by iaNGOs to move the conflict to 
those deemed responsible for governing the social and ecological impacts arising from the action of 
others (Power, 2004). Given the iaNGOs’ experience, resources and expertise in conflicts escalation and 
resolution, we would expect them to use counter-accounts of harm in different arenas, escalating the 
conflict in an attempt to build a powerful coalition of arena participants with a shared change agenda 
(Beck and Wilms, 2004; Power, 2004).  However, this strategy is not without risks, as conflict escalation 
engagements require the de-legitimation of powerful arena participants, which could entrench their stance 
in perpetuating contested risks and actions. Conflict escalation and coalition building typically consists of 
problematising the governance of one arena, challenging the legitimacy, credibility, capacity of rule 
enforcers and political institutions in other arenas. This requires the establishment of some form of 
common purpose amongst arena participants and, as discussed previously, counter-accounts are one way 
to bridge different arenas in order to establish this common purpose.  
Effective accountability should make visible the problems and expectations of all groups connected with 
the exploration and extraction of oil and gas in the Delta region. These include; oil spills and gas flaring, 
severe health problems, poverty, biodiversity loss, loss of land, polluted water, armed conflict, peaceful 
protest, and the oppression and marginalisation of the indigenous people. Dialogic accounts and 
engagements (Contrafatto et al., 2015; Freire, 2002; Thomson and Bebbington, 2005), which consists of 
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formal accounts and informal counter accounts, could support effective and inclusive actions designed to 
facilitate the protection and respect of human rights while protecting legitimate wealth creation and fairer 
wealth distribution. This approach to accountability supports engagement mechanisms to address 
inequalities in social orders by facilitating reflective emancipatory social, economic and environmental 
transformation within and across generations.  
As we will develop in this paper, the lack of inclusiveness, accountability and engagement in the Niger 
Delta has generated considerable criticism from grass roots, local, regional and international NGOs, 
international political institutions and other rule enforcing institutions (e.g. Akpan, 2008; Aroh et al., 2010; 
Christian Aid, 2004; Friends of the Earth, 2011; Frynas, 2003; Omeje, 2005; Pegg and Zabbey, 2013; 
UNDP, 2006; UNEP, 2011; World Bank, 1995). There has been extensive use of counter accounting as 
part of campaign tactics to address the extreme social and ecological harm experienced by indigenous 
communities in the Delta. The paper presents evidence on the use of counter accounts by iaNGOs and 
evaluates their counter accounting practices in relation to their role in problematising, intervening and in 
reforming systems of governance and accountability in Nigeria. Their interventions attempt to balance the 
legitimate quest for sustainable wealth creation, wealth maximisation of multinational corporations, 
government revenues, the ecological impact on the Niger Delta and the protection of the human rights of 
the indigenous people to live sustainably.  
In this paper, we present evidence that counter accounting is a discursive engagement mechanism 
employed by iaNGOs to challenge the hegemony of the state and corporate powers, to promote the need 
for reform problematic governance processes, to address unequal power distributions, give voice to the 
marginalised and silenced, to make visible corporate unsustainable practices, identify governance and 
accountability gaps and contribute to the resolution of problematic consequences of corporate actions 
and governance regimes.  
 
3. Research methods  
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Given our empirical site and the objectives of this paper the underlying research design was informed by 
Georgakopoulos and Thomson (2008) and Thomson et al., (2015) s’ arena frameworks. The empirical 
evidence analysed in this paper was drawn from an ongoing project on human rights, governance and 
accountability gaps, counter accounting and sustainable development in the Niger Delta. Empirical data 
was collected from a range of secondary sources, which included alternative accounts (such as video clips 
and TV documentaries), online material, NGO’s counter accounts, reports by supranational agencies, 
newspaper reports, corporate sustainability reports, regulatory frameworks and other public documents. 
This documentary analysis was used to construct a timeline of the Niger Delta conflict and map out the 
different levels of conflict arenas where we observed the use of counter accounts. Section Four presents 
our analysis of the Niger Delta’s conflict drawn from these sources, including counter accounts. 
Providing a historic context was considered important to understand the different uses of counter 
accounting by iaNGOs when engaging with other arena participants and arenas associated with the oil 
sector in the Niger Delta.  
In addition to this secondary data analysis, this paper draws on the interviews with a number of key arena 
participants, who utilized a range of activist practices that included counter accounting as part of their 
campaigns. These interviewees were purposively selected after our documentary analysis identified the key 
players within this arena, conditional on their willingness to participate. These interviewees had 
considerable knowledge and experience in relation to the conflicts over human rights, environmental 
accountability, governance and sustainable development within the Delta and other conflict arenas. Prior 
to these interviews, participants were sent a summary of the research project and a list of key themes to 
be addressed.  
These themes included; 
• the ability of stakeholders to hold corporations legally and socially accountable for human rights; 
• how civil society organisations have bridged accountability and transparency gaps;  
• the role and impact of counter accounts; 
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• business responsibility for human rights advancement and accountability to stakeholders; 
• dialogic and transformative impact of stakeholders;  
• effectiveness of governance and regulatory frameworks;  
• visions of ideal stakeholder dialogue, human right accounting and the future of the Niger Delta. 
Nine interviews were conducted with representatives of iaNGOs. Seven of the nine interviews were 
conducted through telephone or skype due to scheduling problems and geographical distance while the 
remaining interviews were face-to-face. All interviews were recorded after consent to record and publish 
findings had been agreed with the interviewees and the interviews on average lasted about 52 minutes. 
Our interviewing strategy was to let the interviewees speak for as long as was pragmatically possible. 
Differences in the length of interviews were the result of other commitments on the part of the 
interviewees. All interviews were fully transcribed for data analysis purposes; however, because of the 
sensitivity of the information all interviewees were promised confidentiality and anonymity. The identities 
of our interviewees were anonymized through a coding system as shown in Table 1 below.  
Table 1 about here 
These interviews were conducted between February and October of 2015.  During this period, one of the 
authors visited the Niger Delta to conduct interviews, observe and document examples of social and 
environmental degradation. Fieldwork diaries were kept for every interview and site visited. The 
recordings were listened to several times after transcription in order to correct errors in the transcripts 
and to generate codes for subsequent analysis by NVivo. Subsequently, the transcripts were read several 
times along with the fieldwork notes to generate open codes manually. NVivo was also used to create 
analytical themes and sub themes. These themes were then checked against the open codes and fieldwork 
notes for consistency. A list of all the themes and codes were compiled to identify the most significant 
themes and a secondary close coding exercise was undertaken to reduce our codes to manageable 
analytical themes. We then re-listened to the recording to develop short summaries around the emerging 
close coded themes.  
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The codes that emerged from this iterative process facilitated the descriptive and interpretive analysis 
reported on in Section 5. The codes and underlying themes considered relevant for this paper are; 
addressing power inequalities through giving voice and greater visibility; addressing problematic 
overning and accountability systems and practices; counter accounting to amplify, escalate and build 
coalitions; examples of dialogic counter accounting; the perceived impact of counter accounts.    
We were able to triangulate our empirical evidence from interviews conducted with iaNGOs 
representatives located in Nigeria, UK, Ireland, Netherlands, and USA. We crosschecked interviewees’ 
responses, the initial documentary analysis and evidence from the field trip (Hennink et al., 2011) in order 
to check for contradictions, differentiated perspectives or confirmatory evidence. This procedure enabled 
us to gain an in-depth understanding of the interviews and greater confidence in the robustness of our 
interpretation of our interview material. Whilst it is possible to link our documentary analysis reported in 
section 4 with our interview evidence, we were concerned that this would compromise the confidentiality 
of our interviewees. Given the controversies associated with conflicts in the Niger Delta, we decided to 
present our analysis in two separate sections to avoid the potential of identifying our interviewees.  
 
4. Counter Accounting, Conflicts and the Delta: An Overview. 
In this section, we use our documentary analysis to provide an overview of the Delta conflict and how 
counter accounts were used by iaNGOs and others, in order to help make sense of our analysis of the 
interview data presented in section 5.  
Nigeria is a mono-product rentier state relying on revenue from crude oil production and has been 
criticised from its dependency on oil at the expense of other sectors such s agriculture and 
manufacturing (Abah and Okwori, 2006; Karl, 2005). While oil production remains a source of prosperity, 
it is a resource curse to Nigeria’s main oil production region, the Niger Delta (Abah and Okwori, 2006; 
Amnesty International, 2009, 2011; Amunwa, 2011; Okonta and Douglas, 2003). The Niger Delta, 
Africa’s largest wetland and one of the world’s most important wetland and marine ecosystems, is 
characterised by conflict, poverty, human rights abuse, stench of hydrocarbons and environmental 
destruction (Kadafa, 2012a, b; UNDP, 2006). The ongoing problems in the Delta have attracted high 
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profile engagements from environmental and human rights advocacy NGOs and other institutions, such 
as the United Nations and the World Bank. For an overview of the key events in this conflict see Table 
Two. 
Table Two about here 
The first examples of counter accounts were observed in campaign by the Movement for the Survival of 
the Ogoni People (MOSOP) against Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC) in the 1990s 
(Ako, 2015; Amnesty International, 2009; Senewo, 2015; Social Action, 2014). MOSOP’s protest was 
initiated after 35 years of pollution of the Ogoni people’s air, land and water. SPDC was accused of 
waging ecological war against the Ogonis and the Federal Government was accused of practicing 
genocide (Okonta and Douglas, 2003; Saro-Wiwa, 1992). 
MOSOP’s campaign also included; claims for greater accountability; inclusion in the governing of their 
region; and fairer distribution of the oil wealth. Their engagement tactics were political, non-violent and 
included counter accounts (Ako, 2015; Bob, 2005; Social Action, 2014). MOSOPs’ leaders looked to build 
regional, national and international coalitions of support through peaceful methods (Demirel-Pegg and 
Pegg, 2015; Rowell et al, 2005).5 For example, MOSOP sent a letter to SPDC, Chevron and Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) on the 3rd December 1992, requesting US$10billion for lost 
royalties and damages for environmental degradation. This included a 30-day ultimatum to meet their 
demands or to cease operation in Ogoniland (Bob, 2005; Social Action, 2014). During this 30-day period, 
MOSOP organised a mass protest that triggered series of events that eventually led to the loss of Shell’s 
social licence to operate within Ogoniland (Social Actions, 2014). 
On the 4th January 19936  between 100,000-500,000 people participated in Ogoni Day carrying twigs as a 
symbol of environmental issues and English language banners attacking Shell and the government. These 
banners protested against their political and economic marginalisation, environmental degradation, ethnic 
extinction and proclaimed the Ogonis as indigenous people (Bob, 2005; Senewo, 2015). Demirel-Pegg 
and Pegg (2015, p.655) claimed that the “mass protests across Ogoniland remain the largest peaceful 
demonstrations ever held against an oil company.”  
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In order to amplify their campaign, MOSOP hired a video team and invited Greenpeace to record the 
extent of pollution and environmental damage (Bob, 2005).7 The coalition with Greenpeace allowed the 
Ogoni’s campaign for social and environmental justice to be embedded within an international anti-oil 
campaign and led to the publication of a Greenpeace counter account titled ‘Shell-Shocked: The 
Environmental and Social Costs of Living with Shell in Nigeria’ in 1994 (Bob, 2005).8 However, this campaign 
escalated dramatically from a regional conflict in 1995 with the arrest and subsequent execution of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP activists (the Ogoni 9) by the Federal Government. The hanging of 
the Ogoni 9 activists marked a substantive transformation in the international visibility of the social, 
economic and ecological damage of oil production in the Delta. This was amplified using a range of 
counter-accounts produced by iaNGOs (Amnesty International, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015a; Amunwa, 2011; 
Christian Aid, 2004; Friends of the Earth, 2011; UNEP, 2011). The reaction to the Ogoni 9 execution 
escalated what was a regional partisan campaign into a series of high profile international campaigns for; 
human rights; greater accountability; environmental protection; social justice; corporate responsibility; 
effective governance; and sustainable development (Ako, 2015; Ako and Ekhator, 2016; Baumuller et al., 
2011; Conway, 2010; Gray and Gray, 2011; Ruggie, 2013).9  
Since the 1990s different aspects of the governance and actions of the oil industry in the Niger Delta have 
been subject to challenge and problematisation through campaigns involving counter-accounts. For 
example, the Nigerian oil industry is controlled by joint venture agreements between the multinational oil 
corporations and the Federal Government, represented by the state-owned oil company, NNPC. 
Currently there are six joint venture agreements with Shell, Elf, Agip, Phillips Petroleum, Chevron and 
Total, with NNPC having a majority stake in all six (NNPC, 2015). This results in the Federal 
Government acting as an operator, through NNPC, and a regulator, through the Department of 
Petroleum Resources (DPR) and National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA). 
Amnesty International (2011, p.42) claimed that   
“It is not uncommon for a government to be a partner in a business that it regulates. However, 
unless robust, independent regulatory and oversight mechanisms are in place, conflicts of interest 
can result in violations of human rights.” 
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The governance of the oil industry in the Niger Delta has been characterised by a lack of transparency 
and accountability over basic information, such as the amount of oil revenues generated and royalties 
collected by NNPC from the corporations. The governance of the oil sector is shrouded in secrecy, 
typified by private exchanges between corporations and government, with limited disclosures to 
stakeholder groups (BBC, 2014; Chigbo, 2013). In order to address this lack of transparency counter 
accounts have been used to make visible a catalogue of harm to people and their natural environment, 
which were not included in governmental or corporate accounts of their activities in the Delta (e.g. 
Amnesty International, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015a; Christian Aid, 2004; Friends of the Earth, 2005, 2011, 
2015; SDN, 2014; UNEP, 2011; Steiner, 2010; ECCR, 2010; Social Actions, 2009a,b, 2014; UNDP, 2006).  
IaNGOs consistently identified the lack of effective regulation, limited accountability and poor corporate 
practices as contributing to the Niger Delta ranking as one of the five worst petroleum damaged 
ecosystems in the world (Kafada, 2012; Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010) and one of the world’s poorest 
regions despite its vast oil reserves (World Bank, 1995; UNDP, 2006). The level of oil spillage is massive 
with catastrophic effects. Steiner (2010, p.4) claimed that  
“While the official estimates are that 4.1million barrels spilled into the Gulf of Mexico, recent 
estimates suggest that over the 50-year history of oil operations in the Niger Delta, some 9 to 11 
million barrels of oil have been spilled” 
And Amnesty International (2009, p.16) asserted that 
“To put this into perspective, people living in the Niger Delta have experienced oil spills on par 
with the Exxon Valdez every year over the last 50 years. Despite this, the government and the 
companies have not taken effective measures over these 50 years to prevent oil spills from 
recurring, or to properly address the impacts of oil spills.” 
While the Gulf of Mexico oil spills in 2010 and Exxon Valdez at Alaska in 1989 were subject to major 
efforts to remediate the damage caused (Rushe, 2015), the Niger Delta remained a place of environmental 
degradation and extensive pollution (Amnesty International, 2013; UNEP, 2011). According to Christian 
Aid (2004), oil spills were left untreated for months and any subsequent remediation was of poor quality 
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resulting in an ecological wasteland (Amnesty International, 2009; UNEP, 2011). The oil spills did not just 
destroy the livelihoods of local communities, but also resulted in serious health risks and environmental 
hazards that have significantly diminished the biodiversity of the Delta. Indigenous people are exposed to 
polluted air, damaged land and polluted rivers, which contributed to elevated incidences of diseases such 
as typhoid, skin conditions, gastroenteritis and respiratory disorders (Amnesty International, 2009; 
UNEP, 2011).  
Despite official government and corporate claims of social investments in the Delta the local 
communities have; limited access to electricity or clean water; hospital buildings where no patient had 
ever been treated; school buildings where no lesson had ever been taught; women’s centres where no 
meeting had ever been held; a d a garri (cassava root) processing plant where no garri has been processed 
(Christian Aid, 2004; Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010). Whilst the exploitation of the region’s oil reserves has 
generated massive wealth for some, the average citizens in the Delta were living on less than $1 per day.10 
UNDP (2006, pp.36-37) asserted that 
“The critical issue in the Niger Delta is not only the increasing incidence of poverty, but also the 
intense feeling among the people of the region that they ought to do far better. This is based on 
the considerable level of resources in their midst, and the brazen display and celebration of ill-
gotten wealth in Nigeria, most of which derives from crude oil […] even if poverty is measured 
as living on less than US $1 a day, the true levels of poverty in the region will still be 
underestimated with poverty a way of life due to economic stagnation; agricultural 
underdevelopment from soil infertility; unemployment; poor quality of life due to shortages of 
essential goods, facilities and money; isolation and poor communication; government 
insensitivity; and an unhealthy environment spreading disease and malnutrition.” 
Poverty in the Delta has been described as ‘poverty qua poverty’, a term coined by Ikejiaku (2009, p.16) to 
emphasize the notion of practical absolute poverty where people find it difficult to satisfy their basic 
needs for food, clothing, shelter and education. Yet there were examples of extreme wasteful practices 
that could make a substantive difference to the lives of those living in the Delta. For example, Eboh 
(2014) estimated that in August 2014, 17.3% of the total gas produced was lost due to flaring (which was 
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declared illegal in 1985) representing approximately US$170.2 million of lost income in a single month. In 
addition the flaring contributed to climate change, respiratory disease, eye irritation, skin rashes, cancer; 
damage to agricultural products and biodiversity due to acidic rain, constant noise, heat and light 
(Environmental Right Action/Friends of the Earth, 2005; Social Action, 2009a). The situation in the 
Niger Delta was summarised by Social Action and other iaNGOs as oil corporations and the government 
pursuing profit maximisation, while communities in the Niger Delta bear the real cost of crude oil and gas 
extraction (Social Action, 2009a). This led to a coalition of local, regional, national and international 
advocacy NGOs campaigning to transform the lives of the indigenous people. 
However, frustration over the apparent inability of peaceful civil action, regulations and politics to resolve 
these problems led to the use of violent armed protests resulting in many deaths and injuries. It was 
reported that youths have been driven to a ‘state of hopelessness’ developing a ‘siege mentality’ and the 
belief that violence, illegal bunkering of oil facilities, mistrust of government officials, intra and inter 
community rivalry and illegal activities were solutions to their problems (Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010; 
Social Action, 2009a; UNEP, 2011). Armed protest movements were partially motivated by the 
perception that corporations and those in power were corrupt, looting public funds, ignoring blatant 
conflicts of interest and bribing others in order to continue with the unequal distribution of oil revenues 
(Amunwa, 2011; Frynas, 2003; Okonta and Douglas, 2003).  
Figure One maps out the different conflicts and arenas associated with the oil industry in the Niger Delta 
over the period 1990–2016 and provides an overview of the key arena participants. This figure was 
developed through the application of the framework developed by Thomson et al., (2015) to the 
secondary sources identified in the research methods section. The conflict in the Niger Delta was 
comprised of inter-related arenas operating at four main levels, with different arena participants engaging 
over different problems over a sustained period of time (see also Table Two). IaNGOs can be identified as 
part of the coalition of arena participants operating within and between the national and international 
arenas. 
 Figure One about here 
Page 19 of 52 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal
20 
 
This section has attempted to provide an overview of the context and the use of counter accounts in the 
Delta arena within which our exploration of iaNGOs use of counter accounts can be located. The Niger 
Delta arena is characterised by well documented evidence of extreme social, economic and ecological 
harm, long running social, economic, cultural, political and environmental conflicts between weak, 
marginalised indigenous communities, powerful corporations, and problematic government institutions. 
This section illustrated the problems the iaNGOs were campaigning to resolve in order to situate their 
interviews within wider programmes of transformative actions.  
 
5. IaNGOs, Counter Accounts and the Niger Delta Conflict  
5.1.  Overview of section 
In this section, we present our findings from the semi-structured interviews with representatives of 
iaNGOs. Whilst recognising the interconnectedness and overlapping nature of the interview evidence, we 
present our analysis in relation to the themes that emerged from our review of the literature, documentary 
analysis and interpretation of the interview data. These themes are; addressing power inequalities through 
giving voice and greater visibility; addressing problematic governing and accountability systems and 
practices; counter accounting to amplify, escalate and build coalitions; examples of dialogic counter 
accounting; and the perceived impact of counter accounts.    
 
5.2. Addressing power inequalities through giving voice and greater visibility 
As revealed in section 4, our analysis identified that the indigenous Deltan communities have been 
marginalised, neglected and their human rights violated at the same time as the oil sector developed (see 
Amunwa, 2011; Amnesty International, 2011; UNEP, 2011; Steiner, 2010; ECCR, 2010; Social Actions, 
2009a, b; UNDP, 2006; Christian Aid, 2004). This analysis identified problematic activities of the oil 
corporations and ineffective regulatory frameworks. All the interviewees overwhelmingly supported this 
interpretation. For example, 
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“The reality of the average Niger Deltans’ community is frustration, is the destruction of their 
livelihoods –fishing, farming… The rivers, the lakes and the creeks have been destroyed. These 
people cannot even go back to the fishing that used to give them little means to pay for the school 
fees of their children and feed themselves. On the contrary, their environment is so polluted and 
so, so, so destroyed that there are all sorts of health impacts.” (iaNGOr8) 
The iaNGOrs reported that these communities were effectively powerless, voiceless, economically and 
politically marginalized. For instance, iaNGOr8 claimed 
“What is happening here is scandalous. What is happening here should not happen in the 
civilized society or so called ‘civilized society’. What is happening here, especially at the 
communities’ level, helpless poor communities’ folks, people being exploited in such a way that 
they don’t have anywhere to run to. They cannot run to the federal authorities because they do 
not care. They cannot go to their state government. …Their state government needs the money. 
That is the only thing they have to pay for governors and the commissioners, the projects that 
they flag up and the salaries of the workers. So the state government, even though sometimes, 
they know that these activities are destroying the lives of their own people, they cannot even 
complain. They have become so dependent, like the federal authorities on the oil and gas 
resources. They definitely cannot go to their local government chairman, because the local 
government chairmen are just waiting for the oil revenue to come at the end of every month. 
Therefore, it is a vicious cycle and in the middle of all these, is the people of the region and the 
wellbeing of the people of the region, which is definitely ignored.” 
In these situations, the iaNGOrs felt that their counter-accounts could usefully contribute to campaigns 
that addressed power imbalances, similar to prior research in this field (see for example, den Hond and de 
Bakker, 2007; Gallhofer et al., 2006, 2011; Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; Joutsenvirta, 2011; 
Kneip, 2013; Thomson et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2017). This was evident in the interview extract from 
iaNGOr3 
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“I suppose the theme, or the commitment that holds the work together is a commitment to 
challenging unequal power relations and settling them. We try to tackle the unequal power relations 
in a lot of very different ways, we write, we do analysis, we take court cases, we try and create 
platform for communities. Over the years, I have worked on a lot of communities affected by oil 
pipelines and trying to create a platform for those communities and movement that are sort of 
questioning those infrastructural projects, [particularly] by those who are adversely affected by 
them to raise questions in the UK and in the world most generally.” (iaNGOr3) 
Similar to the arguments of Belal et al., 2015; Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Gray et al., 2014b; Spence, 
2009; Tregidga, 2017; Vinnari and Laine, 2017 and the iaNGOs felt that the inability of these marginalised 
communities to engage, the absence of their voice to speak their truth or to hold the powerful 
stakeholders accountable perpetuated the conflicts within the region. Resolving these conflicts required 
interventions from iaNGOs (and others) to create a significant shift in the power dynamics in favour of 
the indigenous communities.  
Our interviewees recognised that the inadequate human rights and sustainable development 
governance/accountability systems were the result of power imbalances among the arena participants. In 
particular, it was noted that corporations were more powerful than the state and that the state 
inadequately resourced the regulatory frameworks that should protect the local communities and 
environmental resources.  
“There is power struggle but most of the powers are with the oil companies. They are the most 
powerful actors in the Niger Delta. The communities have almost no power and the government 
has its representative in the Delta by government agencies. The government agencies have almost 
no power. They frequently do not have the resources to do their job properly. Therefore, what you 
see is that the actors with the most influential power in the Niger Delta are the oil companies. If 
you go to the regulator, you find that they often do not have the capacities to go to the oil spills 
site. They have to wait for the companies to come and drive them to the oil spills site.” (iaNGOr1) 
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The iaNGOrs interviewed argued that their counter accounts (systematic, partisan and contra-governing) 
and counter actions were intended to make visible the problems faced by the local communities and to 
challenge the powerful stakeholders to mitigate these problems.  
“Farmers have suffered damage, they have lost their livelihood, their fishponds were destroyed, 
they cannot grow fish anymore and they have no source of income. All that could not be contested 
in the Niger Delta.” (iaNGOr2). 
The iaNGOrs interviewed stated that before any emancipatory changes could occur in the Delta, they 
have to problematize by ‘uncovering what is covered’ by the unequal accountability and power relations 
in the ‘crony capitalist’ system and by the perpetrators of environmental and human rights violations (see 
also Fitzgerald and Rodgers, 2000; Bakre and Lauwo, 2016). For example, 
“The communities need to have a say and the local people in the Niger Delta certainly need to 
have a voice in what happens within their communities and within their environment. They have a 
right to crunch the existing systems for their sanctuary. There is the criminality element in the 
Delta that needs to be dealt with.” (iaNGOr5). 
IaNGOs were able to use their expertise to contrast the Delta communities with the treatment of other 
indigenous communities in countries such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Venezuela as part of their 
challenge the legitimacy of Nigerian governance regimes and corporations operating in Nigeria (e.g. 
Amnesty International, 2009; Steiner, 2010).  
Some of the iaNGO’s counter accounts were designed to problematize activities in the Niger Delta by 
making visible corporate non-compliance with existing laws and regulations, in order to use the regulatory 
systems to discipline and punish, what Thomson et al., (2015) refer to as systematic accounts. Systematic 
counter accounts were used to enforce existing governance and accountability systems and support 
indigenous people to use their legal powers in local, national and international arenas. The iaNGOs 
systematic counter accounts included reports of local problems to support the engagement of 
communities in the governance of local issues and enforcement of existing laws. This was characterised 
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by specific accounts/actions against specific breaches of laws, such as the absence of adequate 
environmental impact assessment or delays in reporting oil spills to the regulators.  
 
5.3. Reforming problematic accountability and governance 
IaNGOs regarded good accountability mechanisms as part of effective governance in order that local 
communities could hold politicians, regulators and corporations to account. IaNGOrs argued that in 
order for vulnerable and marginalised communities to develop a stronger voice in existing governance 
systems, an improvement in the quantity and quality of accountability practices were required. Similar to 
the arguments of Brown and Dillard, 2015; Hazelton, 2013 and the iaNGOrs interviewed argued that 
access to information was necessary to facilitate sustainable development, respect for human rights and 
drive accountability and governance reforms. This was due to this enhanced transparency could enable 
greater public scrutiny and debate over values and vested interests.  
“The accuracy and the availability of the information are absolutely critical for the realisation of 
human rights. That is one of the points that we have been trying to communicate repeatedly in 
the Niger Delta.” (iaNGOr7) 
Partisan counter accounts produced by iaNGOs sought to fill the information gaps in the formal 
governance systems by providing alternative accounts of the realities of life in the Niger Delta thus 
allowing stakeholders to participate in the reforms of the system of governing and accountability (see also 
Cooper et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2014b; Spence, 2009; Thomson et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2017; Vinnari and 
Laine, 2017).  
It is claimed that human rights violation, corruption, accountability and governance problems were 
endemic in this region. For instance, our interviewees argued that  
 “It was obvious that the political twist and corruption between the government, and the oil 
companies, the multinational oil companies: that the local interest, their environmental interest and 
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the human rights interest in the communities are left out; and they are marginalised and deflated.” 
(iaNGOr5) 
Similar to the arguments of de Schutter, (2016); Dillard, (2014); McPhail and Ferguson, (2016), the 
iaNGOrs claimed that respect for human rights and sustainable development should be the focus of 
corporate governance and accountability in all parts of the world. For example, iaNGOr1 claimed that, 
“Since UN developed the UN Guidelines on Business and Human Rights, companies also now 
would agree that human rights have to be part of corporate accountability and would be considered 
within corporate governance. I think that is now becoming wide world accepted.” (iaNGOr1). 
This view was supported by iaNGOr7, who argued for more radical reforms in the corporate legal 
landscape,  
“at the moment, the reporting requirement is very minimal in companies’ law, so we need to have far 
reaching changes in companies’ law to require companies to report on their impact. Not just because 
these are material to shareholders but because this can directly affect the communities that are 
affected by companies’ activities.” (iaNGOr7). 
The quality of disclosures by corporations relating to their operations in the Niger Delta was heavily 
criticised:   
“In the Niger Delta, there is absolutely no alignment of anything to do with human right or corporate 
good practice with what the oil companies have been briefing. It is hard to align, for example, if you 
look at the international website of Shell and all the nice things they have said on that website about 
their standards, and then you go to the Niger Delta to verify how these things have been applied, you 
can’t see anything been applied. We have taken Shell ethical principles and we have asked them to 
justify how all these things have been applied in the Delta given the investigation that {name of 
NGO} have done. They did not answer us. I don’t think they have an answer.” (iaNGOr1). 
Our interviewees reported that an important objective of their partisan counter accounts was to hold the 
Federal and State Governments and their regulatory institutions to account for their actions. This was 
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seen as a major accountability gap that cannot be filled with greater corporate disclosures. An important 
objective for the iaNGOs was for the performance of governance systems to become the focus of formal 
accountability requirements. This gap was the focus of a number of their counter-accounts. This was 
summed up by the concept of ‘getting government to get the governance of the government right’ as 
evidenced in the following quote:  
“I think the conversation is not just to increase corporate respect for human rights but it is about 
getting government to get the governance of the government right. So, that accountability can be 
facilitated at the state level and it is about getting companies not to take advantage of the governance 
gap but to hold themselves at a higher standard.” (iaNGOr4). 
IaNGOs used partisan counter accounts as part of campaigns to reform local accountability systems in 
order to ensure that there was full, accurate and trusted disclosure of corporate and government conduct 
and the consequences to all relevant aren  participants.  
“access to information is extremely important because it helps people to be able to know what 
exactly is going on, but the information has to be good information. It cannot be information 
that is made-up. Sometimes, we find the information that the oil companies are publishing is not 
correct. There needs to be oversight. The biggest problem that we have encountered is that there 
is not really an effective regulation of the oil industry. There is no regulator that is making them 
behave properly and that is the biggest accountability problem.” (iaNGOr1) 
Furthermore, our interviewees claimed campaigning and engagement was made more difficult because 
information on exploration and extraction plans, oil spills, gas flaring, how oil revenues are distributed or 
other problems were shrouded in secrecy. The lack of transparency and unaccountability on critical 
aspects of Federal and State governance, regulatory compliance, corporate actions, environmental 
accidents and human right abuses made it very difficult for iaNGOs or local citizens to engage effectively 
using formal channels of communication.  
“There are a lot of things missing. If they were there and functioning fully, when there is an oil spill, 
people could go to government agencies to report and get an independent assessment. But at the 
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moment if there is an oil spill, you have to wait for the oil corporations to come and tell you the cost 
and how much oil is spilled” (iaNGOr1). 
All of the iaNGOrs interviewed were campaigning to improve the governance and accountability systems 
in the Niger Delta, in relation to human rights and environmental protection. Similar to the findings of 
Cooper et al., (2005, 2011), Tregidga, (2013) they confirmed that partisan counter accounting had played a 
significant part in these campaigns in the Delta (see also section 4). A series of counter accounts 
questioned the ability of citizens living in the Niger Delta to enforce any regulations, report 
noncompliance or seek redress.11 These citizens were reliant on the regulatory authorities to carry out 
their responsibilities to protect individuals and their natural environment. Gaps in the practice of 
governing of these responsibilities were almost impossible for the citizen to overcome. For example:   
“if you are living in the Delta, you have an oil spill and you want to sue the company for the 
damage it is very, very difficult because you have to go to the Federal court. But that is the 
problem. Even when you go to the court at the State level, you will face a big challenge partly 
because the court system is quite slow and partly because you will find that all of the good 
lawyers are working for the oil companies. So, if you are a poor farmer or a poor fisher person, 
then where would you get a good lawyer to represent you in court because they will all be 
working for the company who can pay them much more than you can pay them? So you have a 
double disadvantage in the Delta.” (iaNGOr1) 
The iaNGOrs identified critical gaps and tensions between the corporations, the government, rule 
enforcers and the communities. These gaps and tensions were founded on a normative belief held by the 
iaNGOs and the communities that corporations have a moral obligation to be fully accountable and 
transparent with stakeholders regardless of whether there is a formal requirement for such accountability 
and engagement (Bebbington et al., 2007; Messner, 2009; Parker, 2014; Robert, 2009; Shearer, 2002).  
Whilst the iaNGOrs did recognise the transformative potential of their partisan counter accounts, they 
did not consider their counter accounts as a permanent part of governance systems. Their counter 
accounts were considered a tactical and political intervention when they perceived critical accountability 
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gaps and problematic systems of governance. Their partisan counter accounts (Dey and Gibbon, 2014; 
Thomson et al., 2015) were intended to transform the formal systems, not to replace them.  
In the interviews, there was strong support for accountability systems that were dialogic in nature in order 
to protect and respect human rights and promote sustainable development. There was consensus among 
those interviewed that corporate powers need to be re-evaluated, particularly in the context of developing 
countries (as also argued by Belal et al., 2015; Rahaman, 2010; Ramasastry, 2015; Sikka, 2011). The 
iaNGOrs interviewed argued that the inequality of power and ownership structures limited the 
effectiveness of the engagement of the communities in the arena and they had no significant voice to hold 
the corporations and the government accountable for human rights abuse or environmental pollution. In 
cases where indigenous groups were unsuccessful in redressing their plight within the existing governance 
and accountability system, the iaNGOs recognised the need to escalate (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; 
Thomson et al., 2015) the conflicts from the local arena to regional, national and international arenas 
using bridging counter accounts.  
 
5.4. Amplification, escalation and coalition building 
The iaNGOrs viewed their counter accounts as a bridging mechanism that facilitated an escalation of 
conflicts through alternative channels of information to investors, senior corporate managers, lenders, 
national and international political institutions. In particular when problems were not visible in formal 
accountability channels or in the public domain. Bridging counter accounts constructed new linkages 
between what was formally reported and what was not disclosed but visible in the local arena. Thereby 
serving as mechanisms of challenge, evidence based critique (Spence, 2009) and enabling conflict 
escalation (Thomson et al., 2015).  
“a lot of the social reporting that we do is highlighting the problem and putting pressure on the oil 
companies and the government to take actions. Therefore, we found out that the media coverage 
that the report gets compels the companies to make improvement. Also, we send our reports to 
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the investors in the oil companies and they then talk to the oil companies and push them to make 
improvements.” (iaNGOr1). 
As part of their campaigns iaNGOs were aware of the ability of counter accounts to reframe conflicts. 
For example, using human rights frameworks to represent the damage caused by oil spills in order to gain 
legitimacy and traction in governance systems with authority over human rights violations. This led to 
strategies of conflict escalation using bridging counter accounts to relocate the conflict to arenas with the 
power to de-legitimate, impose sanctions and drive reform processes.  
In addition, they viewed their counter accounts as an amplification mechanism to provide indigenous 
communities national and international voices. For example, iaNGOs made use of international standards 
to create a normative evaluation of the global acceptability of these local practices. For example, the 
UDHR (1948) and UN’s principles on business and human rights (Ruggie, 2011) were powerful framing 
devices that were used as dividing practices to determine the legitimacy of corporate and state (in)actions. 
These reframing, bridging counter accounts sought to demonstrate that if universal human rights were 
not being respected, then that corporations and the state were acting illegitimately when judged against 
principles of modern democracy.  
“Our social reports will always focus on the role of the host state to the existing investment because 
the host state has a duty to protect from the international human rights treaty that the host state has 
signed up. We also focus on the home state, where the company is listed, where the parent company 
is registered because we believe that the home state has an obligation to hold their companies 
accountable, including for the activities of their subsidiaries overseas. So, we try to focus on all the 
different actors, who can influence the situations.” (iaNGOr7). 
The iaNGOrs interviewed supported the drive for corporations to become globally accountable for their 
human rights performance and environmental impact. As discussed earlier, these changes were supported 
by filling perceived gaps in the provision of reliable information and evidence that is required to govern 
inclusively and effectively, supporting the arguments of Bebbington et al., (2007), Brown (2009), Brown 
and Dillard (2015), Gray et al., (2014b), amongst others.  
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IaNGOrs recognised that better accountability in the Niger Delta, including the extensive use of different 
types of counter accounts, would be unlikely to bring about change (see for example, Li and McKernan, 
2016; Spence, 2009). In order to achieve any significant change in the Niger Delta, the iaNGOrs reported 
the need to build coalitions with the power to exercise significant leverage on the corporations and the 
host governments. These potential coalitions include investors, supranational political institutions, judicial 
systems and international rule enforcers. For example;   
“I went to Bodo and they just had a big court case in Britain, where Shell has settled. The damage 
there was quite unbelievable.” (iaNGOr3) 
The importance of inclusive governance systems with appropriate access to sanctions and justice was a 
common theme in the interviews. For example, where the judicial system of the country where a 
corporation operates is not adequate for its citizens to seek judicial redress, the iaNGOrs argued that 
indigenous people should be able to seek redress where the corporations are registered or controlled 
from. IaNGOrs expressed their frustration over the limited impact of decades of systematic campaigning 
within Nigeria. This frustration led to campaigns that involved the publication of coalition building 
counter accounts intended for international audiences to de-legitimate the corporations involved and the 
support for lawsuits for human rights and environmental justice (some successful) in United States of 
America, United Kingdom and the Netherlands (as evidenced in Amnesty International, 2015b; Arnott, 
2009; Deutsch, 2015; Friends of the Earth Netherland, 2015; Vidal, 2015).  
The iaNGOs were supported by the interventions from international institutions, such as the UN and 
World Bank, who had produced series of highly critical reports that problematized the activities of the 
corporations and the Nigerian state (UNDP, 2006; UNEP, 2011; World Bank, 1995; see also Table Two 
and Figure One). These counter accounts combined over time with other engagements practices such as 
press releases, lobbying, publicity stunts, petition, protest, scientific video evidence on YouTube, 
newspapers articles (similar to that described in Joutsenvirta, 2011; Kneip, 2013; Thomson et al., 2015) led 
to sustained pressure for the implementation of social and environmental governance and accountability 
reforms in accordance with recognised national and international human rights conventions in the Delta 
arena. 
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Key to their amplification and escalation strategies, the iaNGO’s accounts of selected aspects of life in the 
Niger Delta were made available to an international audience, including those stakeholders with power 
over the managers of the oil corporations operating in the Niger Delta and the Nigerian State. A typical 
response was; 
“we only intended to shine light on the exact situation, the truth and that is what science does; is 
that it identifies the truth in any situations to the parties in the group both the oil companies, the 
Nigerian government, the state government in the Delta. The international communities have to 
take that in and do something with it. The extent to which our reports have changed corporate 
behaviours, I am unclear of but my hope and my belief is that these reports have changed 
international perspective of what corporation has not done in the Niger Delta. It has raised the 
standard of the attention that the world pays to the Niger Delta environmental and human right 
crisis. It is a crisis!’ (iaNGOr5) 
Some of the iaNGOs’ bridging counter accounts sought to delocalise and escalate the conflict from the 
local arena in order to confront those with the power to enforce change by delegitimising corporate and 
governance regimes in Nigeria (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; 
Joutsenvirta, 2011). These bridging partisan counter accounts were seen to be useful in rebalancing power 
structures by making visible to the world the harm caused in the Niger Delta in international conflict 
arenas. IaNGOrs argued that without a rebalancing of powers through coalition building, it would be very 
difficult to address the environmental degradation and human rights abuses of the indigenous 
communities. The iaNGOrs identified themselves as having the capability to initiate an increasing ‘practice 
of freedom’ to address accountability and governance gaps by empowering indigenous people and local 
organisations to make use of the iaNGOs resources in order to escalate the conflicts galvanising 
international groups, host government and investors groups to stop the unsustainable practices in the 
Delta (similar to arguments of Bebbington et al., 2007; Contrafatto et al., 2015; Gallhofer et al., 2006; 
Spence, 2009; Thomson et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2017). 
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5.5. Dialogic counter accounting 
Prior research suggested that there was limited evidence of counter accounting being used in dialogic 
processes (Brown and Dillard, 2015; Dillard and Roslender, 2011; Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; 
Thomson et al., 2015). However, the interviews with the iaNGOrs provided evidence of attempts to use 
counter accounting dialogically and the importance of inclusive dialogue in their campaigns. For instance, 
iaNGOr9 claimed in relation to their counter accounts that,  
“The emphasis has been to sort of help to address the challenges that arise in the context of the 
extractive industry. Issues like the relationship between the operators and the host communities 
and the regulators. The impacts of these operations on the environment and on the livelihoods of 
the community members. The need to facilitate dialogue between the communities and the 
operators.” (iaNGOr9) 
Contrafatto et al., (2015) argued that dialogic counter accounts should incorporate accounts of existing 
problematic ways of thinking, governing as well as accounts of possible solutions in order to expose the 
nature and contradictions of the impediments to emancipatory change. The interviews revealed that the 
iaNGOrs incorporated solutions as well as problematisations in many of their counter accounts. For 
example  
 “Primarily, our concern is usually on the communities’ people, who are living and working 
within the society. Depending on the nature of the report, if the report is going to be looking to 
find solution around a difficult issue. We will speak to…whomever the report is going to be 
criticising. We do not believe in just criticising because it has to be solution focused… …, if we 
are laying out negative practices; we often engage them [the oil industry] and give them the 
chance to respond before we publish.” (iaNGOr6) 
An important characteristic of dialogic accounts was a co-production process, which authentically 
represented oppressed groups’ voices and avoided the domination of powerful groups, such as the 
international NGOs. The iaNGOs were aware of this problem and allowed the communities’ voice to 
emerge and sought to develop the necessary capacities in the communities to participate in any 
Page 32 of 52Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal
33 
 
transformative dialogue. Similar to Contrafatto et al., (2015), the iaNGOs involved the local advocacy 
NGOs and community representatives in problematising oppressive aspects of their life and participating 
in the design and implementation of campaigns.  
 “A lot of our research is done with our partner organisations and we always engage with all 
stakeholders, so we talk to the communities that are affected, we talk to government officials and 
we talk to the oil companies. For all of our work, we talk to all of the different stakeholders and 
we give feedback to them on the findings of our research. That is part of our process.” 
(iaNGOr1) 
The iaNGOrs reported as to how they worked indirectly with local NGOs and directly with community 
representatives suffering social, economic and environmental harm in order to co-produce counter 
account of their situation.  
“We have partners who are supporting the communities to hold companies and NOSDRA 
accountable to oil spills and remediation. What they do in creating the ground for the community 
is to go to the community, create the awareness as to what they can do in this regard; and 
working with the community to appoint people who can help in documenting and reporting on 
oil spill cases and also training such people and providing them with the equipment that can 
facilitate that.” (iaNGOr9) 
However, the iaNGOs also reported how they involved the companies and government institutions in the 
counter accounting process, particularly those with the responsibility and power to resolve the issues that 
would be raised in the counter accounts. For example, iaNGOr1 reported that it was their practice to 
discuss their counter accounts with corporations and regulators giving them an opportunity to address 
these problems before the counter accounts were made public. 
“When we do our research, we go and speak to the communities about the investigation we are 
doing, we will talk to them about our work and what could happen and what would they want 
{name of NGO} to be saying. Therefore, we ask them what do they want, they might say they 
want clean up and compensation. In addition, we talk about what we could do and what our 
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partner organisations could do. Then we will go from there to ask for a meeting with the 
operators, we will go to their offices in Port Harcourt12 and discuss our findings, ask them what 
they have to say and if they are willing to meet with us. We will go to NOSDRA, we will talk to 
them about what is their work, what do they feel is the issue and what do they think an 
organisation like {name of NGO} should focus on. We do that every time we do research, we 
talk to all of the stakeholders and we try to talk obviously on the ground in Port Harcourt and in 
Abuja, when we are doing the meeting.” (iaNGOr1) 
The interviewees provided valuable insights into how they prepared and used their counter-accounts. 
Despite the scale and urgency of the problems facing communities in the Niger Delta and the polarised 
position of many participants, the iaNGOrs reported how they acted as intermediaries between the 
different arenas participants and where possible established dialogic engagement processes (Bebbington et 
al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Brown et al., 2015; Cooper and Owen, 2007; Dillard and Roslender, 2011). From 
our analysis in section 4 and the interviews there was evidence to partially support the iaNGOr’s claims to 
adopt a dialogic approach to counter accounting.  
However, limitations in our research methods mean that these claims could not be fully evaluated. For 
example, evidence would have to be gathered from all groups in the arenas (see figure one) to evaluate 
their engagements with the iaNGOs. Our analysis of the iaNGOs counter accounts and their description 
of their processes suggests that they only partially meet the necessary attributes of dialogic counter 
accounting (Brown and Dillard, 2015; Contrafatto et al., 2015; Thomson and Bebbington, 2005). The 
iaNGOrs interviews reported an intention to engage in co-operative dialogue and participation wherever 
it was pragmatic to do so. Whilst they made visible the catalogue of abuse suffered by local communities 
and the natural environment in powerful and compelling ways to those in power their counter accounts 
were clearly oppositional. Many of their counter accounts were intended to bring the power of others into 
play and force change on those abusing their powers in the Niger Delta. Therefore, they are more 
appropriately classified as partisan, bridging counter accounts, rather than dialogic.  
This does not mean that the iaNGOs were not adopting dialogic engagement practices in their 
campaigns, but rather it was the counter-accounts that were not wholly dialogic. This evaluation of the 
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content and nature of the accounts was similar to the observations in relation to ASH in Thomson et al, 
(2015). However, it was differentiated by the iaNGOs’ stated desire to enter into constructive dialogue 
with the oil companies and regulators to determine a common cause for change. This can be contrasted 
with ASH’s position that they felt there were no areas where they could find common cause with BAT 
(Thomson et al., 2015). In the Niger Delta, there did appear the possibility of common cause among 
iaNGOs, oil companies, local NGOs, local communities and government institutions. However, as will 
be discussed in the next section this common cause remained a rather elusive possibility.  
 
5.6. Impact of Counter Accounting in the Delta 
The iaNGOrs were explicit in their evaluation of counter accounts that whilst there had been limited, the 
majority of the conflicts in the Delta remained unresolved. There was a sense of limited optimism for the 
potential for change through the cumulative impact of decades of campaigning. Oil spills and gas flares 
remained major environmental problems, which combined with human rights violations and failure to 
remediate affected locations within a reasonable timeline, were substantial obstacles to sustainable 
development (Amnesty International, 2009, 2011, 2013; UNEP, 2011). It was recognised that even if the 
accountability of oil spills and gas flaring was improved and regulations appropriately enforced, the legal 
sanctions lacked sufficient bite to impact on corporate behaviour. There was a concern that the 
governance system remained problematic and any substantive improvement within a reasonable timeline 
was unlikely (see also Amnesty International, 2015a, 2013, 2011; UNEP, 2011).  
The iaNGOrs reported how some of the issues raised in counter accounts were captured by the 
corporations due to ineffective regulatory regimes (see also Amnesty International, 2011 2013; Christian 
Aid, 2004; Friends of the Earth, 2011; Amunwa, 2011; Pegg and Zabbey, 2013; Steiner, 2010; UNEP, 
2011). In many cases the iaNGO’s systematic counter accounts were based on the assumption that when 
problems were made visible, the corporation would act to correct the underlying issues. The iaNGOrs 
recognised that this was not always the case and often the corporation implemented superficial or 
symbolic actions with no substantive changes in the suffering of those living in the Delta. For example;   
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“Shell has traditionally not done the right job in clean-up, … they go through the motions, they 
make it look like they have been responsible at cleaning things up but on the contrary, in actually 
getting oil out of the environment, they have failed time and time again. And this is the ways things 
have been going-on in the Niger Delta for decades […] They [oil companies] have made 100 of 
billions of dollars off the Niger Delta over the last 50 years and have put very little back into it. 
They do little projects; they built a water treatment centre and left it without maintenance to fall 
apart. They built schools, no teachers and books. They do the things that look good on a quarterly 
report to their shareholders, but they do not have any substance in the Delta.” (iaNGOr5) 
The iaNGOrs claimed the cumulative production of counter accounts had reformed some of 
accountability and corporate governance practices that facilitated more effective communication and 
engagements 
“From what we have observed over time is that the accounts have galvanised companies to 
become a lot more serious about responding to concerns as they are raised.” (iaNGOr4) 
As discussed in earlier sections the iaNGOrs sought to reform particular aspects of the governance 
system in Nigeria. There was recognition that their partisan counter accounts had some impact on the 
politics of oil governance and in reforming part of the regulator system. One impact of their partisan 
counter accounts was to disrupt the political dynamics and power struggles surrounding the governance 
of oil exploration activities whilst recognising the long-term nature of this type of campaigning (see 
Thomson et al., 2015; Tregidga, 2017) 
“the report13 has paralysed the actions within the Nigerian government and within Shell. 
Sometimes it takes several years 5, 6 or 8 years to start seeing the impact of these reports but I truly 
believe that they do have positive impact in shifting the political dynamics” (iaNGOr5) 
There was consensus by the iaNGOrs that the launch of the Oil Spill Monitor (OSM) in January 201414 
was a very positive development (SDN, 2014). The OSM, a web-based interactive map, evolved from a 
partnership with NOSDRA and a coalition of NGOs. The OSM was an accountability initiative to reduce 
the impact of oil pollution and provide open access to detailed accounts of the cause, timing, location, 
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quantity of pollutant and remediation activities. The OSM makes visible oil spill data and how oil 
corporations are fulfilling their legal duties as well as the impact of third party interference and sabotage 
on the environment. Communities have full access to the OSM and can use its website to report oil spills 
to regulators. 
“I think the biggest success is probably the oil spill monitor, where you see collaboration between 
civil societies, the government, and the oil industry looking to create public transparent platform to 
document every single oil spill that is happening in Nigeria.” (iaNGOr6) 
However, there were concerns expressed that despite the enhanced transparency facilitated by the OSM, 
it has not been accompanied by governance reforms or additional resources to mitigate or prevent oil 
spills, or to remediate affected land and rivers. The iaNGOrs recognised that the OSM has improved the 
visibility of the problem and was an integral part of the solution to oil spills, however knowing there has 
been inestimable barrels of oil spilled and that none of the leaks have been adequately remediated was 
best regarded as a pyrrhic victory (see also Amnesty Report, 2015a, 2013, 2009; Amunwa, 2011). Better 
accounting for this problem allowed iaNGOs and other coalition partners to ask better questions about 
what had been done, but had not led to the resolution or remediation of the problematic consequences of 
oil spillage.  
 
6. Concluding Comments 
In this paper, we set out to contribute to prior research on external accounting, theoretically and 
empirically, through research into the use of counter-accounts by iaNGOs in oil related conflicts in the 
Niger Delta (e.g. Apostol, 2015; Dey et al., 2011; Gallhofer et al., 2006; Gray et al., 2014b; 
Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008; Sikka, 2006; Spence, 2009; Tregidga, 2013, 2017; Vinnari and 
Laine, 2017). The counter accounts studied were intended to improve the lives of the long-suffering, 
marginalised communities and the natural environment of the Niger Delta . Contrary to criticisms of 
counter accounting (Gray and Gray, 2011; Li and McKernan, 2016; Medawar, 1976; Spence, 2009) the 
iaNGOrs were largely positive as to the contribution of counter accounting in facilitating emancipatory 
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changes in an unsustainable, poorly governed arena. The iaNGOrs considered counter accounts to be a 
useful problematising tool within the Niger Delta and effective in making visible human rights violations, 
unsustainable corporate practices, problematic governance systems to those with the power to bring 
about change (Frankental, 2011; Gallhofer et al., 2011, 2015; Gray and Gray, 2011; Lauwo and Otusanya, 
2014; Sikka, 2006, 2011). 
 
Our research supports the work of others that counter accounting is not a singular practice with a single 
purpose, but is a complex set of accounting practices that operates differently in different contexts (e.g. 
Adams, 2004; Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014; Collison et al., 2010; Contrafatto et al., 2015; Cooper et 
al., 2005; Dey and Gibbon, 2014; Rodrigue, 2014; Thomson et al., 2015). The evidence presented 
demonstrated the different ways iaNGOs’ used counter accounts at different stages of conflicts, for 
different purposes and within different engagement strategies. These included: systematic accounts 
reporting non-compliance; oppositional counter accounts to contradict corporate accounts; counter 
accounts that empowered and built capacity in local communities; partisan accounts to reform 
problematic aspects of governing; counter accounts that reframed conflicts; conflict escalation counter 
accounts; coalition building counter accounts; arena bridging counter accounts; as well as confrontational, 
de-legitimating counter accounts. Before outlining what we consider to be the main contributions of our 
paper, we would like to note a number of important limitations to our work and identify opportunities for 
further research.  
 
This paper concentrated on iaNGOs’ opinions on the use of counter accounts in a long running, highly 
contested, multi-issue conflict that is still largely unresolved (See Table Two and Figure One). However, 
our primary evidence was drawn from 9 interviews with representatives from 9 iaNGOs undertaken in a 
9 month period in 2015. In addition, these interviewees were purposively selected based on their prior use 
of counter accounts. This form of sampling is likely to create a bias towards interviewees that are more 
favourable to counter accounting than in the wider iaNGO population. This bias could also be further 
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